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Contentious Engagement: Understanding 
Protest Participation in Latin American 
Democracies 
Mason W. Moseley 
Abstract: Why has protest participation seemingly exploded across 
much of Latin America in recent years? How do individual- and country-
level characteristics interact to explain the rise of contentious politics in 
countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela? I contend that the recent 
wave of protests in Latin America is the result of trends in community 
engagement and institutional development across the region’s young 
democracies. Specifically, I argue that low-quality institutions in demo-
cratic regimes push an increasingly large number of civically active Latin 
Americans toward more radical modes of political participation, as gov-
ernments’ abilities to deliver on citizens’ expectations fail to match the 
capacity for mobilization of active democrats. Drawing on cross-national 
surveys of Latin America, I test this argument, finding that an interactive 
relationship between community engagement and ineffective political 
institutions helps explain the recent spike in protest activity in certain 
cases and the vast differences in protest participation observed through-
out the region.  
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Introduction 
Despite widespread belief that contentious protests would shift from 
being the norm to the exception with the consolidation of democracy 
(e.g. Hipsher 1998; Eckstein 2001) and passage of purportedly demobi-
lizing neoliberal reforms (e.g. Kurtz 2004; Oxhorn 2009), the past decade 
is peppered with examples of large-scale protest movements across Latin 
America – many of which have had important consequences for demo-
cratic politics in the region (e.g. Silva 2009; Bellinger and Arce 2011; 
Boulding 2014). Indeed, the recent salience of mass protests has been 
such that if a casual observer of Latin American politics assumed there 
was a band of disgruntled demonstrators banging pots and pans on every 
street corner south of the Rio Grande, it would be hard to blame her. 
Yet the reality is that for every Latin American country that is engulfed 
in intense cycles of protest (e.g. Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru), there is 
another where contentious tactics are seldom utilized and citizen partici-
pation is primarily channeled through formal political institutions (e.g. 
Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Panama).  
These highly disparate trends in protest activity across Latin Ameri-
ca offer an important opportunity to better understand variation in terms 
of contentious politics in a region where much of the existing research 
suggests we should find very little. Why has protest participation explod-
ed in certain countries while not in others in recent years? More specifi-
cally, how do individual- and country-level characteristics interact to 
explain why some individuals protest while others do not?  
I attempt to answer these questions by focusing on the interaction 
between individuals’ access to organizational resources and institutional 
context. I argue that, ceterus paribus, citizens engaged in community 
organizations are more likely to protest than are those individuals with 
low levels of involvement in civic life. Thus, one element for understand-
ing protest across Latin America in recent years can be found in the 
region’s socioeconomic and demographic trends, which reveal higher 
percentages of educated, formally employed, and socially connected 
individuals than at any time in history. However, this is only part of the 
story. For while these citizens will channel their energies through formal 
modes of political participation in political systems with strong, reasona-
bly well-functioning representative institutions, the same individuals are 
more likely to turn to protest when living in countries where political 
institutions fail to provide effective democratic representation. Converse-
ly, such institutional failings will have little effect on a disengaged citizen-
ry, and this therefore helps explain low levels of protest in contexts 
where few citizens are involved in civic life. In evaluating this interaction 
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of institutional context and community engagement, Latin America of-
fers an ideal collection of cases that vary across both of these critical 
dimensions.  
A key contribution of this work, then, is to highlight the interaction 
between institutional context and patterns in community engagement 
with respect to individuals’ proclivity to engage in contentious tactics. In 
a series of cross-national analyses of individual-level survey data, I find 
that neither individual-level characteristics nor institutional-setting fea-
tures alone fully explain protest behavior. Rather, only when viewed 
together do we have a more complete picture of why protest seems to be 
more common in certain Latin American regimes than in others.  
The Rise of Community Engagement in Latin 
America
From an economic standpoint, the twenty-first century has been good to 
most Latin American countries. Buoyed by new trade relationships with 
China and other East Asian countries, Latin America’s largely commodi-
ty-based economies have grown at unprecedented rates in the new mil-
lennium. From 2003 to 2007 Latin American countries experienced an 
average GDP growth rate of 6 percent, marking the most successful five-
year period of growth in the post–World War II era (Ocampo 2008). In 
2010, while the advanced industrialized world was still mired in a severe 
economic crisis, Latin American economies expanded by about 6 percent 
(World Bank 2012; see Figure 1). Latin America has not only achieved 
economic growth, it has also made gains in terms of poverty reduction 
and education. The region’s poverty rate dropped from 44 percent in 
2002 to 33 percent in 2008 (ECLAC 2013), while the number of Latin 
Americans with tertiary degrees rose from 9 percent in 1990 to 14 per-
cent in 2009 (World Bank 2013). 
In conjunction with these advances in socioeconomic development, 
electoral democracy has finally consolidated its status as the only legiti-
mate regime type in the region. Despite democratic “backslides” in coun-
tries like Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua (Weyland 2013), no country 
in the region has undergone a full-scale reverse transition to authoritari-
anism. Moreover, there is evidence that Latin Americans have become 
more active democrats in recent years. According to cross-national sur-
veys, Latin Americans overwhelmingly support democracy as the best 
form of government and, since 2004, have become increasingly interest-
ed in politics, active in elections, and participatory in their communities 
(LAPOP 2004–2012). 
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Figure 1. Economic Growth in Latin America, 2003–2011 
Source:  World Bank 2012. 
The expansion of access to the Internet and social media has also had 
important consequences for politics in the region, with five Latin Ameri-
can countries ranking in the global top 10 in terms of social network 
“engagement” (hours spent per month) and social media increasingly 
being utilized for political purposes (The Economist 2013; Valenzuela, 
Arriagada, and Scherman 2012). The end result of all of these trends is 
that Latin America has become a region where many (but not all) citizens 
are highly engaged in democratic politics and their communities via in-
terpersonal and virtual activities – perhaps more than at any other point 
in the region’s history.1 
How might recent trends in socioeconomic development and in-
creases in community engagement relate to protest? In the 1970s schol-
ars began to shift their attention from grievance-based explanations of 
protest (e.g. Gusfield 1968; Gurr 1970) to the causal mechanisms that 
might explain why grievances translate into collective action in certain 
cases but not in others.2 Instead of drawing on relative deprivation ar-
1  “Community” and “civic” engagement will be used interchangeably throughout 
this paper, which is in keeping with the literature on the topic. 
2  Despite this trend in the protest literature, some recent work has delved into 
the potential causal influence of specific types of grievances in spurring protest 
involvement (Finkel and Muller 1998). Land and income inequality (Muller and 
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guments, the “resource mobilization” approach offers attempts to ex-
plain such cases by taking into account the socioeconomic factors that 
underpin the formation and sustainability of social movements. For 
scholars adhering to this particular theoretical construct, the primary 
determinants of whether or not social movements emerge and are suc-
cessful lie in a particular movement’s access to the organizational re-
sources necessary for mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977). 
According to Jenkins,  
the formation of movements is linked to improvements in the sta-
tus of aggrieved groups, not because of grievances […] but be-
cause these changes reduce the costs of mobilization and improve 
the likelihood of success. (Jenkins 1983: 532)3 
In Latin America studies have found that citizens who are more highly 
educated, interested and active in politics, and connected to civil society 
organizations are the most likely to engage in protest (e.g. Booth and 
Seligson 2009; Moreno and Moseley 2011; Boulding 2014). Moreover, 
numerous in-depth analyses have outlined how specific shifts in organi-
zational linkages between individuals and groups helped spur the mobili-
zation of contentious movements in the region (e.g. Walton and Ragin 
1990; Eckstein 2001; Yashar 2005; Garay 2007). Thus, it would seem 
that, at the individual-level, the resource mobilization approach partially 
explains which individuals are more likely to protest in Latin America, 
especially in an era when more citizens have access to organizational 
                                                                                                    
Seligson 1987, Sen 2002, Jenkins, Jacobs, and Agnone 2003), neoliberal re-
forms and associated austerity measures (Walton and Ragin 1990; Arce 2008; 
Roberts 2008; Silva 2009; Bellinger and Arce 2011), and political repression or 
exclusion in authoritarian regimes (Loveman 1998, Bunce 2003) have all been 
attributed causal weight in spurring mass mobilizations. Moreover, journalistic 
accounts of virtually any episode of mass mobilization – from Occupy Wall 
Street to the Arab Spring to the recent protests in Brazil – tend to focus on the 
grievances being voiced by demonstrators as a primary causal factor rather than 
longer-term economic and political trends. 
3  In particular, the resource mobilization school received a boom from studies 
on the US civil rights movement published in the 1960s and 1970s. While in 
many ways, blacks in the United States encountered the same grievances they 
had faced during the decades prior to this time period, access to organizational 
resources changed drastically in the direct lead-up to the civil rights movement. 
Indeed, it seemed that increased urbanization, the growth of historically black 
universities, and an expanding black middle class led to the removal of tradi-
tional paternalistic social relations between (particularly, Southern) whites and 
blacks and paved the way for a thriving national movement (McAdam 1982; 
Jenkins 1983). 
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tools than ever before. Yet at the aggregate level, the resource mobiliza-
tion approach predicts (successfully as applied by Dalton, van Sickle, and 
Weldon 2010) that rates of protest participation are highest in the most 
economically developed contexts, where more citizens possess the or-
ganizational resources to build movements and articulate their interests. 
This perspective is at odds with a case like Bolivia, for example, which 
ranks as Latin America’s most contentious country (LAPOP) while also 
being one of the region’s most underdeveloped. Moreover, while coun-
tries like Peru, Argentina, and Ecuador have grown rapidly in recent 
years and played host to numerous mass demonstrations, other countries 
like Uruguay and Costa Rica have grown at impressive rates but failed to 
register high protest numbers. Therefore, while resource mobilization 
clearly helps explain current trends in protest activity across Latin Amer-
ica at the individual level, it falls short in capturing why individuals  
in certain countries in the region are so much more contentious than  
others. 
The Persistence of Flawed Institutions 
Latin America is a region populated by regimes of varying democratic 
quality (e.g. O’Donnell 1993; Diamond 2002; Levitsky 2002; Gibson 
2006; Tommasi and Spiller 2007; Levitsky and Murillo 2009; Levine and 
Molina 2011; Scartascini and Tommasi 2012).4 Although every country 
in the region aside from Cuba is widely characterized as a formal, elec-
toral democracy (though some regimes, like Venezuela, probably require 
additional adjectives (Collier and Levitsky 1997)), Latin American re-
gimes differ substantially in how effectively their formal political institu-
tions channel participation and implement public policy.  
Much of the recent literature on Latin American democratic politi-
cal institutions has focused on institutional weakness in countries across 
the region and how such weakness might contribute to poor representa-
tion outcomes and policy output. According to Levitsky and Murillo 
(2009), two dimensions define institutional weakness: enforcement and 
stability. In many Latin American countries, the formal “rules of the 
game” (North 1990) often change or are not enforced. For example, 
presidents in countries like Argentina, Venezuela, and Ecuador, among 
others, have sought to change reelection laws in order to remain in pow-
4  Democratic quality can be defined as the extent to which regimes adhere to 
democratic norms like “freedom, the rule of law, vertical accountability, re-
sponsiveness, and equality” (Diamond and Morlino 2004: 21). 
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er. Many presidents in the region have also pursued “court-packing” 
strategies – despite explicit legal prohibitions against doing so – to at-
tempt to establish political control over the judicial branch or have elim-
inated the autonomy of their respective central banks (e.g. Helmke 2002; 
Boylan 2001). This degree of institutional uncertainty often has dire 
consequences for the quality of public policy as it encourages shortsight-
edness among government officials, who in many cases are not qualified 
for the positions they hold (Spiller and Tommasi 2007). 
Shortcomings related to institutional weakness and poor governance 
are manifested in Latin Americans’ attitudes. Despite widespread support 
for democracy as a form of government across the region, confidence in 
key regime institutions like political parties, legislatures, and law en-
forcement remains low in many Latin American countries (Booth and 
Seligson 2009). In addition, even though Latin America has experienced 
unprecedented economic growth and reductions in poverty, satisfaction 
with public services like education, healthcare, and transportation con-
tinues to be comparatively low (LAPOP 2012). High crime rates plague 
many countries in the region, increasingly so in Venezuela, Mexico, and 
much of Central America (Ceobanu, Wood, and Ribeiro 2011; Bateson 
2012). Thus, it would appear that a gap has emerged between Latin 
Americans’ demand for democracy and the supply of democracy (Brat-
ton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005), as diffuse support for democracy 
has been consolidated while criticism of specific regime actors and dis-
satisfaction with government performance has persisted and in some 
cases increased (Booth and Seligson 2009).  
Within the protest literature, the potential relationship between in-
stitutional context and protest has been discussed and even empirically 
tested. Specifically, scholars employing the “political opportunities” ap-
proach have sought to uncover the political mechanisms that allow pre-
viously unexpressed grievances to materialize. This might entail a focus 
on how processes of democratization and political liberalization or, with-
in existing democracies, how the role of political parties, labor unions, or 
important legal decisions structure potential protest activity (Huntington 
1968; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Kitschelt 1986; Brockett 1991). Others 
have compared rates of protest in contexts characterized by different 
levels of democratic “openness,” positing a curvilinear relationship be-
tween political openness and protest (Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978, 2006; 
Muller and Seligson 1987). According to this logic, protest movements 
arise and flourish more frequently in moderately open regimes, where 
public opposition is tolerated and widespread but representative institu-
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tions do not fully facilitate effective participation, than in regimes at 
either end of the openness spectrum (Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978). 
Empirical work on the impact of political institutions on protest 
participation has produced mixed results. In their cross-national study 
utilizing data from the World Values Survey, Dalton, van Sickle, and 
Weldon (2010) find that more democratic, high-functioning (i.e. “open”) 
institutional contexts produce higher rates of protest participation than 
do authoritarian regimes or weakly institutionalized democracies (see also 
Norris 2002). However, in recent studies of Latin America, scholars have 
shifted toward examining how weak political institutions in democracies 
can push citizens toward adopting contentious tactics (e.g. Boulding 
2010, 2014; Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi 2011; Arce and Man-
gonnet 2012; Arce 2014). A focus on more specific features of national 
level political institutions by Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi (2011) 
in their study of Latin American democracies reveals that institutional 
weakness actually increases the prevalence of protest participation within 
that regime. Boulding’s research examines diversity in participation tac-
tics utilized by NGOs, finding that NGOs are more likely to encourage 
protest participation in weakly institutionalized contexts, where voting 
and other types of formal participation are viewed as less effective. 
Scholars have also found that electoral losses tend to foment more “pro-
test potential” in new democracies than in established ones (Anderson 
and Mendes 2006) and that neoliberal reforms can spark contentious 
participation under democracy in Latin America (Silva 2009; Belliger and 
Arce 2011).  
Despite the considerable contributions of these recent studies, a 
single-minded emphasis on institutional characteristics as the decisive 
determinant of contentious participation seems to ignore the critical role 
that swelling rates of community engagement have played in producing 
protest across Latin America. Protest movements have failed to gain 
traction in a long list of countries with low-quality institutions, including 
those with authoritarian regimes where representational institutions are 
nonexistent or ineffective but grassroots engagement is limited. Moreo-
ver, protests often materialize in countries with “good” institutions, as 
was the case in Chile in 2011 and in the United States during the Occupy 
Wall Street movement, due in part to the dense organizational networks 
that exist in such democracies. For this reason, I argue that any cross-
level explanation of protest must factor in individual-level communi-
tyengagement, as these critical organizational linkages serve as a neces-
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sary condition for any potential institutional effect on contentious poli-
tics.5 
Contentious Engagement in Flawed
Democracies
In the face of trends related to community engagement and institutional 
quality in contemporary Latin America, I argue that a combination of 
high levels of civic engagement among citizens and ineffective political 
institutions precipitates more radical modes of political participation, as 
regimes’ abilities to deliver on citizens’ expectations fail to match the 
mobilization capacity of the citizenry. Thus, where individuals are en-
gaged in civic life and interested in politics but institutional quality is low 
(e.g. unresponsive or inconsistent representational vehicles, fickle sys-
tems of checks and balances, and weak rule of law), protest emerges due 
to the inability of formal political institutions to adequately channel and 
respond to the voices of active democratic citizens.  
Politically active individuals utilize protest as a means to more 
forcefully exert their influence on the regime given their mistrust of 
formal political institutions and the lack of efficacy they perceive in op-
erating through conventional vehicles. Thus, contrary to the traditional 
perspectives that protest movements are either largely precipitated by the 
alienation of economically deprived segments of society, or that protest 
is a healthy by-product of liberal democracy and economic development, 
I argue that in contemporary Latin America protest has become part of 
politically active citizens’ participation “repertoire” (Tilly 1986) – that is, 
5  Boulding’s work investigating how second-level institutional characteristics 
condition the participation patterns of NGOs represents an excellent contribu-
tion to both our understanding of Latin American NGOs and the conditioning 
effect of institutions on patterns of participation. However, we still have not 
fully unraveled how political environments interact with a host of mass-level 
indicators of engagement to explain protest participation, nor how citizens’ as-
sessments of institutional quality and public-service provision affect conten-
tious participation. This paper, therefore, represents an extension of a similarly 
interactive theoretical framework to (1) a larger number of cases and (2) a larger 
universe of repertoires of community activism and engagement. NGO activity 
falls within the realm of community engagement and should motivate protest in 
weak institutional settings for the reasons enumerated above. However, I argue 
that it is not unique in this regard, as other forms of community activism, inter-
est in politics, and education have similar stimulative effects. 
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the set of options at the disposal of collective actors – in systems devoid 
of effective political institutions. 
While the term “community engagement” might seem like a syno-
nym for “protest participation” rather than part of the causal explanation 
of protest, it in fact refers to the extent to which citizens are knowledge-
able about and interested in political issues and are connected to the 
types of social and political networks that can serve to foment collective 
action. The degree of community engagement in a given context is thus 
well measured by survey items used to gauge political interest and in-
volvement, membership in local organizations, and exposure to political 
information-sharing via social networks. In contexts where institutions 
are high performing, we expect that highly engaged citizens will partici-
pate in politics primarily through formal (or “conventional”) vehicles, 
where their concerns will be adequately addressed at little personal cost. 
However, where representative institutions are weak, high levels of 
community engagement will be expected to give rise to a different type 
of participation, as citizens come to believe that formal institutions do 
not adequately represent their interests or respond to their claims and 
thus pursue more aggressive, likely costlier, tactics. In sum, weak political 
institutions alone do not necessarily guarantee that protests will occur; 
rather, it is the combination of weak institutions and a readily mobilized 
citizenry that produces societies with high levels of protest.  
The specific mechanisms that determine how well regimes channel 
and respond to popular demands might include the quality of party rep-
resentation, the effectiveness of governments in implementing policy 
and providing public services, and the extent to which rule of law institu-
tions provide citizens with equal protection under the law (Kitschelt 
1986; Przeworski 2010; Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi 2011; 
Scartascini and Tommasi 2012).6 Political institutions in Latin American 
democratic systems vary greatly in terms of their ability to offer citizens a 
representational outlet and their capacity to translate citizens’ policy 
preferences into government output. For example, while political parties 
have been relatively programmatic in Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica, 
party platforms and ideological positions vacillate wildly in Argentina, 
Peru, and Paraguay, and clientelistic linkages pervade (Kitschelt et al. 
2010; Arce 2014). In Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, the executives 
have long possessed the power to act unilaterally and basically render 
6  In their 2011 piece Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi argue that where insti-
tutionalized modes of participation are deemed unproductive, citizens adopt 
“alternative political technologies” as a more direct means of obtaining repre-
sentation (also see Scartascini and Tommasi 2012). 
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legislative bodies inconsequential, whereas the presidents in Uruguay and 
Chile wield considerably less power to rule by decree and must adopt 
more collaborative tactics when pursuing policy agendas (e.g. Mainwar-
ing 1990). Chile boasts effective law enforcement and low levels of cor-
ruption, but Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil are characterized by police 
corruption and weak judicial and legal institutions despite having similar 
levels of economic development to Chile (e.g. Seligson 2006). Where 
such formal institutions fail to perform the roles ascribed to them on 
paper, I argue that frustrated citizens are more likely to pursue alternative 
forms of claim-making in order to be heard.  
Nonetheless, focusing solely on the role of institutions overlooks a 
key piece of the puzzle: community engagement – that is, individual-level 
linkages to mobilizing structures like community organizations or social 
media. My emphasis on this concept as a conditioning variable in this 
process comes from the literature on resource mobilization and protest 
(e.g. McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; Jenkins 1983). Engaged citi-
zens are more likely protestors for two reasons. First, they are more 
likely to have access to the key organizational tools required for com-
municating and mobilizing. Second, through their active involvement in 
political and nonpolitical organizations, they have more exposure to the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of formal institutional structures, 
which provides them with information about the necessity and/or effec-
tiveness of protest participation.  
At the individual level, then, aggrieved citizens first look to the for-
mal political institutions in place to channel their demands. If they re-
spect those formal vehicles and believe they can obtain some response 
from the government by voting, writing a letter to their representative, or 
supporting a political party, they see less need to take to the streets and 
protest given the relatively lower costs of formal participation. Where 
those institutions are deemed unresponsive, individuals must turn to 
other options to voice their claims. However, only when individuals have 
access to the types of community networks that can help mobilize con-
tention will that frustration with formal institutional outlets translate into 
action. In sum, whereas a minimal level of community engagement is in 
many ways a prerequisite for protest participation, the effect of institu-
tions is conditional on these mass-level factors. Although community 
engagement should predict protest participation in most settings, it 
should have a particularly strong impact on contentious behavior in weak 
institutional contexts.  
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Data and Measurement 
To test the theoretical framework proposed above, I use data from the 
Latin American Public Opinion Project’s (LAPOP) AmericasBarometer 
surveys from 2008, 2010, and 2012, which consist of representative na-
tional surveys of individuals from 24 countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. The key dependent variable comes from a question that asks 
respondents whether they participated in a street march or public 
demonstration during the previous 12 months.7  
Figure 2 displays the percentage of respondents who participated in 
a protest from 2008 to 2012 in each Latin American country included in 
the AmericasBarometer biannual surveys. Clearly, significant variation 
exists in the region in terms of the extent to which protest has been 
adopted as a form of political participation. Bolivia had the highest rate 
of protest participation in Latin America at 19 percent, followed closely 
by Argentina, Peru, and Haiti. Bolivia also experienced the most conten-
tious single-year rate of participation, with nearly 30 percent participation 
in 2008. These results immediately cast doubt on the notion that high 
levels of development produce high levels of protest, as Haiti and Bolivia 
are among the poorest nations in the Americas, while in countries such 
as Jamaica, Panama, and El Salvador, protest appears to be extremely 
uncommon, with barely 5 percent of citizens registering participation. 
The data used in the present study is superior to the cross-national 
data on protest participation employed in other studies for two primary 
reasons. First, the current study is uses data from the AmericasBarome-
ter surveys from 2008 to 2012, which all specify a time frame of the past 
12 months when inquiring about protest participation – something that 
other cross-national projects like the World Values Survey have not 
always done. Questions that fail to establish a time frame cannot be 
certain to measure current levels of protest participation, but instead 
likely capture an individual’s lifetime account of protest activity. Such 
data are likely to indicate higher rates of protest participation in older 
democracies, where protesting has been permitted for many years, even 
if current levels are not particularly high. 
7  See Appendix for specific question wording for all variables included in the 
analysis and the summary statistics for each variable. 
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Figure 2. Percent of Respondents Who Participated in a Protest, 2008–
2012 
Source:  The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP (2008–2012). 
Although these data do not demonstrate present levels of protest, the 
predictors of protest (e.g. community activity, wealth, and even levels of 
education) do reflect current conditions. This temporal disconnect be-
tween the independent and dependent variables then casts doubt on the 
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meaning of findings that are based on this measure of protest activity – 
such as those based on World Values Survey data from before 2005.8 
Second, the AmericasBarometer survey offers multiple time points 
at which we can evaluate the determinants of protest participation for 
each country, which helps remedy any potential bias related to an outlier 
year for a particular country and increases the number of observations 
for second-level variables. For example, protest participation was rela-
tively low in Chile in 2010 (and seemingly before, though we lack Ameri-
casBarometer data to confirm) but skyrocketed to 11 percent in 2012, 
placing it in the top five in the region. Therefore, one round of surveys 
can capture an anomalous moment in a country’s history given the often 
sporadic nature of large protest events. By taking into account results 
from three separate surveys, the present study provides a more balanced 
view of a country’s proclivity to protest over time that is less subject to 
exceptional years and episodes of mass contention. 
At the individual level the key independent variable for capturing 
community engagement is an index that gauges the frequency with which 
citizens participate in local organizations. Respondents were asked how 
often they attended meetings for a variety of community organizations 
during the previous year, including community improvement associa-
tions, parent organizations, professional associations, religious groups, 
and political parties. The response options provided were “Never,” 
“Once or Twice a Year,” “Once or Twice a Month,” and “Once a 
Week.” I then coded the response levels from 0 (“Never”) to 3 (“Once a 
Week”) and added the five variables to form a single “engagement” in-
dex, which was then rescaled as 0–100. I argue that this variable effec-
tively measures the extent to which individuals are engaged in communi-
ty activities and have access to the organizational structures that have 
been demonstrated to help facilitate collective action by a number of 
recent studies on resource mobilization and protest in Latin America 
(e.g. Garay 2007). Indeed, several of the countries with the highest rates 
of community engagement in the region – for example, Bolivia and Haiti 
– are also among the most contentious (see Appendix).  
At the individual level I also include variables for interest in politics, 
level of education, and use of social media to share or receive political 
8  In the most recent version of the World Values Survey questionnaire available 
online (2005) the question now includes the phrase “during the last five years.” 
However, all previous surveys – which have been used in the studies cited 
above, including the key study by Dalton, van Sickle, and Weldon (2010) – only 
ask respondents whether they have ever participated in any of the enumerated 
activities, without limiting responses to a certain time period.  
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information – each of which measures an individual’s capacity for being 
mobilized and thus serves as a proxy for the resource mobilization ap-
proach (see Dalton, van Sickle, and Weldon 2010). In addition, I draw 
from questions on support for key political institutions and satisfaction 
with public services to shed light on how perceptions of political institu-
tions influence individuals’ proclivity to protest. To control for compet-
ing theories regarding the influence of specific grievances on protest 
participation, I include individual-level variables for presidential approv-
al, evaluations of individuals’ personal economic situations, evaluations 
of the national economic situation, and socioeconomic status.9 Interper-
sonal trust is also included, as many argue that trust in one’s fellow citi-
zens increases an individual’s probability of protesting (e.g. Inglehart 
1989; Dalton, van Sickle, and Weldon 2010). 
For the second-level variables (i.e., country-level variables) on insti-
tutional quality, I turn to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indi-
cators (WGI). The WGI offers measures on six dimensions of govern-
ance, three of which are relevant to this study: Voice and Accountability, 
Government Effectiveness, and Rule of Law. These measures represent 
the views of business, citizens, and elite survey respondents, and are 
based on “30 individual data sources produced by a variety of survey 
institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international 
organizations, and private sector firms” (WGI website). These indicators 
offer the best combination of coverage across countries and time and 
rigorous measurement techniques for the countries included in the 
AmericasBarometer survey – though the indicators are certainly not 
without drawbacks (see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2007). De-
scriptions of each dimension from the creators of the indicators can be 
found in the Appendix.  
9  In addition to arguments regarding the more general economic determinants of 
protest across national contexts and individuals (e.g. Dalton, van Sickle, and 
Weldon 2010), these variables provide proxies for several Latin American–
specific theories focusing on how corruption scandals (particularly those linked 
to particular presidents) and short-term economic shocks can drive individuals 
to protest (e.g. Smulovitz and Perruzzoti 2000; Hochstetler 2006; Pérez-Liñan 
2007). While it is not my intention to explicitly contradict these studies, it 
would seem necessary to adequately address their findings in any model specifi-
cation that seeks to understand protest participation across the region. Indeed, 
one might argue that many of these theories fall under the umbrella of declin-
ing system support, which is very much in keeping with the notion that when 
individuals lose faith in formal institutions (e.g. due to some sort of massive 
corruption scandal), they become increasingly motivated to adopt more conten-
tious strategies.  
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Each of these three dimensions captures an important component 
of institutional quality and is tested individually as a second-level predic-
tor of protest participation.10 Voice and Accountability helps gauge the 
extent to which individuals can effectively participate in politics and 
obtain representation in government, while Government Effectiveness 
measures regime transparency and capacity in the making and implemen-
tation of public policy. Rule of Law gauges how well regimes offer citi-
zens equal protection under the law, which is a crucial characteristic of 
effective democratic governance. I also combine the three variables to 
create an additive index called the Institutional Quality Index, which I 
use in the analyses below as an indicator of the institutional environment 
in which individual citizens operate.  
In Figure 3 countries are listed in terms of their average Institutional 
Quality Index score for the period 2008–2012. Chile leads the region in 
terms of institutional quality with a score of 1.2.11 Unsurprisingly, Haiti 
and Venezuela score lowest at -1.2 and -1.1, respectively, while a large 
group of Latin American countries hover around zero. These scores 
indicate that even though democracy predominates in the region, the 
quality of political institutions and governance varies greatly, with the 
majority of regimes not living up to modern standards of liberal democ-
racy.  
As controls, I include second-level measures of human develop-
ment, inequality, and economic growth during the year of the survey. 
These variables serve to evaluate grievance-based explanations of con-
tentious politics as well as to provide assurance that the causal effects of 
variation in institutional quality on protest participation are not a func-
tion of an omitted variable linked to both institutional quality and protest 
levels.  
 
10  For country values on each of these indicators, please see the table in the Ap-
pendix.  
11  As a reference point, the score for the United States during this time period 
was 1.39.  
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Figure 3. Mean Institutional Quality Scores, 2008–2012 
Source:  The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP (2008–2012).
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across Latin America that highlight the microfoundations of protest 
behavior. In the second set of models, I then incorporate the national-
level variables discussed above in order to assess the impact of these 
second-level institutional factors on individual-level protest participation.  
Individual-Level Models 
Table 1 displays the results from the first set of models, each of which 
employs logistic regression given the dichotomous nature of the depend-
ent variable.12 In Model 1 we see that several variables emerge as strong 
predictors of protest participation, none more so than Community En-
gagement. An increase from the 0 to 50 on the Community Engagement 
scale nearly triples an individual’s probability of protesting when holding 
other covariates at their means (see Figure 4).13 Moreover, a person at 
the highest value in terms of community activism is more than four 
times more likely to participate in a protest than someone in the lowest 
quintile when holding other variables constant at their means. In keeping 
with the resource mobilization approach to explaining protest participa-
tion, education and interest in politics also have strong positive effects 
on the probability of participating in a protest. At the individual level, 
then, engagement certainly plays a decisive role in motivating protest 
participation.  
On the other hand, several variables seem to decrease Latin Ameri-
cans’ likelihood of participating in a protest. Net of other factors, women 
are less likely to participate in a protest, and age has a significant negative 
impact on protest participation as well. Perhaps most importantly for the 
purposes of this paper, System Support has a significant negative effect 
on the probability of taking part in a protest march or demonstration – 
which means that individuals who view key regime institutions more 
positively are less likely to protest, while those with more negative evalu-
ations are more likely to protestor. 
12  These logistic regression models account for the complex nature of the survey 
data, which include stratification and clustering. Both models were also run in-
cluding fixed effects for countries and years, with Uruguay and 2012 as the 
baseline. However, given that this did not affect results, those coefficients are 
not reported in Table 1. All countries are weighted to an equal N.  
13  Predicted probabilities are calculated using Stata 12’s “margins” command 
while holding other variables in the model at their mean. Graphs were made us-
ing the “marginsplot” command, which graphs the results from “margins.” 
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Table 1. Individual-Level Models of Protest Participation in Latin America 
and the Caribbean 
 Protest Participation 
(1=Protested) 
Protest Participation 
(1=Protested) 
Variables Model 1 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Model 2 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Female -0.282** -0.292*** 
 (0.025) (0.049) 
Age -0.008*** -0.005*** 
 (0.0009) (0.002) 
Wealth (quintile) -0.011 -0.078*** 
 (0.010) (0.019) 
Interest in Politics 0.011*** 0.009*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0008) 
Education 0.324*** 0.309*** 
 (0.021) (0.039) 
Community Participation 0.026*** 0.0273*** 
 (0.0008) (0.001) 
Presidential Approval -0.002*** -0.003** 
 (0.0006) (0.001) 
Interpersonal Trust -0.00*** -0.001 
 (0.0004) (0.0008) 
Personal Economic Situation -0.002*** -0.002* 
 (0.0007) (0.001) 
National Economic Situation 0.0005 0.0007 
 (0.0006) (0.001) 
Perception of Corruption -5.15e-05 -0.002* 
 (0.0005) (0.0009) 
System Support -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (0.0007) (0.001) 
Efficacy 0.0007 0.0005 
 (0.0005) (0.0008) 
Satisfaction with Public 
Services -- -0.006*** 
 -- (0.001) 
Shared Political Information 
via Social Network -- 0.009*** 
 -- (0.0007) 
Constant -2.786*** -2.569*** 
 (0.0910) (0.168) 
Observations 88,513 29,248 
Source:  The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP (2008–2012). 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Two-tailed 
tests. 
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Figure 4. Predicted Probabilities Based on Changes in Levels of Commu-
nity Engagement 
Source: The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP (2008–2012).
Even though this effect is far less substantive than that of Community 
Engagement, moving from the lowest quintile in terms of system sup-
port to the highest results in a 25 percent decrease in the probability of 
participating in a protest (from .12 to .9).  
One individual-level finding that seems to hint at a potential cross-
level interaction between institutional quality and civic engagement is the 
interaction between System Support and Community Engagement (Fig-
ure 5).14 As predicted, low support for the system and high engagement 
produce the highest probabilities of participating in a protest. Perhaps 
most interesting about this interaction though is the extent to which the 
effect of low system support is conditional on at least a moderate level of 
community involvement. At minimal levels of Community Engagement, 
no decrease in System Support seems to increase the probability of pro-
testing; however, even with a slight increase in Community Engagement, 
the effect of System Support surfaces.  
14  These predicted probabilities were derived from inserting an interaction term 
into Model 1; thus, all of the variables appearing in Table 1 were held at their 
mean when calculating predicted probabilities.  
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Figure 5. Predicted Probabilities: Interaction between System Support and 
Community Engagement 
Source:  The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP (2008–2012).
Model 2 adds variables for information sharing via social networks and 
satisfaction with public services to the equation. Each of the questions 
that serve as the bases for these two variables was only asked in 2012, 
meaning that the number of observations drops substantially. However, 
both variables have significant effects on an individual’s probability of 
protesting. The findings show that an increase in satisfaction with public 
service provision decreases the odds of protesting, whereas those who 
actively share or receive political information through social networks are 
nearly three times more likely to participate in a protest than those who 
do not when holding other variables at their means and modes. The 
effect of evaluations of public services mirrors the effect of system sup-
port – that is, a lack of faith in formal political institutions and the state’s 
competence in providing for citizens’ welfare is associated with higher 
protest participation. Information sharing via social networks appears to 
have a similar mobilizing effect to community engagement, political 
interest, and education.  
In sum, based on these predictive models of protest participation in 
Latin America from 2008 to 2012, it appears that citizens who are active-
ly engaged in their communities – namely, those who are interested in 
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politics, participate in community organizations, and share political in-
formation via the Internet – and citizens who have negative views of key 
regime institutions and public services are the most likely protestors.15 
While these initial findings comport with the theoretical approach out-
lined above, the more important test of how institutional environment 
shapes participation repertoires requires a multilevel approach, which 
follows in the next section. 
Multilevel Models 
In the second set of models country-level variables were added to each 
model and multilevel fixed-effects logistic regression models were esti-
mated to account for variation between countries during the three survey 
years under consideration. In other words, the second-level variables 
listed in each model describe “country years” – namely, the national 
context in which individuals from each round of the AmericasBarometer 
responded to the survey questions. The results for eight models of pro-
test participation are presented in Table 2. In addition to the individual-
level variables that proved consequential in the regional analyses present-
ed above, second-level economic variables serve as controls in each 
model. Variables for the WGI indicators of institutional quality were 
added one at a time in the first four models in Table 2, and then interac-
tion terms were inserted in the last four models. 
15  In any attempt to propose and test a causal argument using cross-sectional data, 
endogeneity is justifiably a concern. In this case the most plausible alternative 
explanation would be that protest actually increases community engagement, in 
that demonstrations might link formerly unassociated protestors to established 
civic organizations. Replacing a potentially problematic variable with an in-
strument unrelated to the outcome variable can help solve this problem (Sovey 
and Green 2011). A two-stage least squares model instrumenting for protest 
with ideology (an instrument deemed “not weak”) coupled with a Hausman test 
somewhat assuages concerns that the causal arrow flows from community en-
gagement to protest and not the other way around, as I was unable to reject the 
null hypothesis of exogeneity. However, I include results from an instrumental 
variables regression model that instruments for community engagement in the 
Appendix. While the predicted effect of community engagement on protest is 
somewhat attenuated, it remains one of the strongest predictors in the model.  
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Table 2. Multilevel Models of Protest Participation in Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Variables Protest Partic-
ipation 
(1=Protested) 
Model 3 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Protest Partic-
ipation 
(1=Protested) 
Model 4 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Protest Partic-
ipation 
(1=Protested) 
Model 5 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Protest 
Participation 
(1=Protested) 
Model 6 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
 
Female 
 
-0.293*** 
 
-0.293*** 
 
-0.293*** 
 
-0.293*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Age -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Quintile of 
Wealth  0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Interest in 
Politics  0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Education 
(years) 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.273*** 0.273*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Community 
Participation  0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Presidential 
Approval -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Interpersonal 
Trust -0.0009** -0.0009** -0.0009** -0.0009** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Personal 
Economic 
Situation  
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
System Sup-
port -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Gini (2009) 3.999 3.968 4.131 4.004 
 (2.529) (2.580) (2.555) (2.552) 
HDI (2007) 1.833 0.238 0.474 0.873 
 (2.279) (2.031) (2.007) (2.115) 
Growth (annu-
al) 0.019 0.027 0.027 0.026 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) 
Government 
Effectiveness -0.400    
 (0.257)    
Voice and 
Accountability   -0.162   
  (0.260)   
Rule of Law   -0.199  
   (0.204)  
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Variables Protest Partic-
ipation 
(1=Protested) 
Model 3 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Protest Partic-
ipation 
(1=Protested) 
Model 4 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Protest Partic-
ipation 
(1=Protested) 
Model 5 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Protest 
Participation 
(1=Protested) 
Model 6 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Institutions 
Index    -0.284 
    (0.254) 
Institutions 
Index * Com-
munity Partici-
pation  
    
     
Community 
Dummy     
     
Institutions * 
Community 
Dummy  
    
     
Institutions * 
Education      
     
Institutions * 
Interest in 
Politics  
    
Constant -6.564** -5.198** -5.598** -5.798** 
 (2.562) (2.411) (2.460) (2.482) 
Observations 93,933 93,933 93,933 93,933 
Number of 
Country Years 67 67 67 67 
 
Variables Protest Parti-
cipation 
(1=Protested) 
Model 7 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Protest Parti-
cipation 
(1=Protested) 
Model 8 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Protest Parti-
cipation 
(1=Protested) 
Model 9 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Protest 
Participation 
(1=Protested) 
Model 10 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
 
Female 
 
-0.290*** 
 
-0.258*** 
 
-0.295*** 
 
-0.293*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Age -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Quintile of 
Wealth  0.006 0.004 0.006 0.007 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Interest in 
Politics  0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Education 
(years) 0.273*** 0.267*** 0.342*** 0.272*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) 
Community 
Participation  0.013*** -- 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.0006)  (0.0005) (0.0005) 
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Variables Protest Parti-
cipation 
(1=Protested) 
Model 7 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Protest Parti-
cipation 
(1=Protested) 
Model 8 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Protest Parti-
cipation 
(1=Protested) 
Model 9 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Protest 
Participation 
(1=Protested) 
Model 10 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Presidential 
Approval -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Interpersonal 
Trust -0.0009** -0.0006 -0.0009** -0.0008** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Personal 
Economic 
Situation  
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
System Sup-
port -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Gini (2009) 3.971 4.110 3.897 4.018 
 (2.549) (2.556) (2.553) (2.550) 
HDI (2007) 0.993 0.652 0.979 0.916 
 (2.113) (2.118) (2.116) (2.113) 
Growth (an-
nual) 0.025 0.025 0.027 0.026 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Government 
Effectiveness     
     
Voice and 
Accountability      
     
Rule of Law     
     
Institutions 
Index -0.190 -0.079 -0.684*** -0.353 
 (0.255) (0.258) (0.264) (0.256) 
Institutions 
Index * Com-
munity Partici-
pation  
-0.004***    
 (0.001)    
Community 
Dummy  0.551***   
  (0.034)   
Institutions * 
Community 
Dummy  
 -0.320***   
  (0.057)   
Institutions * 
Education    0.188***  
   (0.033)  
Institutions * 
Interest in 
Politics  
   0.001** (0.0007) 
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Variables Protest Parti-
cipation 
(1=Protested) 
Model 7 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Protest Parti-
cipation 
(1=Protested) 
Model 8 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Protest Parti-
cipation 
(1=Protested) 
Model 9 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Protest 
Participation 
(1=Protested) 
Model 10 
Coeff. (s.e.) 
Constant -5.840** -5.800** -5.970** -5.860** 
 (2.479) (2.486) (2.483) (2.480) 
Observations 93,933 93,993 93,933 93,933 
Number of 
Country Years 67 67 67 67 
 
First, it should be mentioned that the second-level economic variables 
included here seem to play a relatively minor role in explaining individu-
al-level protest dynamics in Latin America during the time period under 
consideration.16 Neither inequality nor human development nor GDP 
growth during the year of the survey emerge as significant predictors of 
protest participation, which raises questions about the general arguments 
regarding the macrolevel economic conditions under which protests are 
most likely to occur (e.g. Dalton, van Sickle, and Weldon 2010). Alt-
hough individuals’ perceptions of their personal economic situation do 
continue to carry some weight, as do negative performance evaluations 
of the current president, wealth is not a strong predictor of participation, 
and the substantive effects of economic evaluations pale in comparison 
to those of variables measuring political interest and engagement (see 
below). However, the lack of results for the economic variables does not 
mean that economic grievances fail to play any role in motivating in-
stances of contentious behavior; rather, it indicates that many citizens 
experiencing economic hardship choose not to protest, while others in 
comfortable economic situations choose to do so. Moreover, perhaps 
some other specific macroeconomic trend (e.g. unemployment, inflation, 
or a currency devaluation) influences individuals’ proclivities to protest 
in ways that these relatively general measures of economic well-being 
cannot capture. Indeed, the results of individual evaluations of personal 
economic situation and the sitting president would support this notion. 
Yet through this combination of country-level and individual-level con-
trols for economic factors, I feel confident that the results for institu-
16  In response to feedback on an earlier draft of this paper, I have included three 
models in the Appendix that test the hypothesis that economic context has a 
similarly conditional influence on protest participation to the interactive rela-
tionship between community engagement and institutional factors. This would 
make intuitive sense given that if institutional weakness only exerts a stimula-
tive impact on individuals who are already connected to mobilizing organisms, 
economic stagnation, too, might only activate protests among similarly engaged 
citizens. However, I find no such significant interactive effect.  
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tional factors and community engagement presented below are not simp-
ly picking up on an omitted grievance-related variable.  
The relationship between institutional context and protest participa-
tion is a thornier one to interpret. In each of the first four models, it 
appears that the institutional variables – while having the predicted nega-
tive sign – fail to attain statistical significance as predictors of protest 
involvement. This would seem to indicate that institutional environment 
itself does not have a significant impact on the probability that individu-
als within that context will protest when controlling for other individual- 
and aggregate-level factors, which contradicts the findings of Machado, 
Scartascini, and Tommasi (2011).  
However, the theory I put forth in this paper is an interactive one, 
whereby institutions interact with community engagement to affect indi-
viduals’ likelihood of adopting contentious political behaviors. In Model 
7 I interact the Institutional Quality Index, a country-level variable, with 
Community Engagement, an individual-level variable. The coefficient is 
negative and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The fact that 
the effect of the Institutional Quality Index is insignificant in this model 
indicates that it is not an important predictor of protest where Commu-
nity Engagement equals zero. However, the significance of the interac-
tion’s coefficient indicates that this changes as the two interacted varia-
bles’ values change.  
Figure 6 displays the predicted probabilities of participating in a 
protest depending on variation in institutional context and community 
engagement. By graphing changes in the predicted probabilities, we can 
clearly observe that the causal impact of institutional context changes 
drastically depending on community engagement levels, and vice versa. 
Where Community Engagement equals zero – that is, citizens have no 
ties to any of the five types of civic organizations referred to in the ques-
tions that make up the index – the Institutional Quality Index has no 
effect on the probability of protesting. However, as community engage-
ment increases, the causal importance of institutional context begins to 
emerge. Where Community Engagement equals 50, it seems that citizens 
in low-quality institutional settings become substantially more likely to 
protest when holding other individual- and second-level variables at their 
means and modes. Where community involvement is high, the differ-
ences in probabilities are even starker; indeed, whereas a maximally en-
gaged individual in a low-quality institutional environment (Institutional 
Quality Index = -1) possesses a .48 probability of participating in a pro-
test, that same individual in a high-quality institutional environment only 
possesses a .26 probability of participating. Thus, active citizens are near-
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ly twice as likely to protest in low-quality institutional contexts compared 
to high-quality institutional contexts.  
Figure 6. Predicted Probabilities: Interaction between Institutional Context 
and Community Engagement 
Source:  The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP (2008–2012). 
As a robustness check, Model 8 offers a similar interaction term with an 
alternative coding of the community engagement variable. I use the vari-
able Community Engagement Dummy to identify those individuals who 
were at least minimally participative in one community organization 
(coded as 1) and those who possessed no ties to local community groups 
(coded as 0).17 Throughout Latin America roughly 22 percent of re-
spondents were completely unengaged in their communities, while 78 
percent were at least minimally participative.  
Predicted probabilities for this interaction are presented in Figure 7. 
Again, it appears that the causal import of community engagement and 
institutional quality are highly dependent on one another. Engaged citi-
zens in low-quality institutional environments are almost twice as likely 
17  This alternative coding of the engagement variable controls for the possibility 
that a small number of hyperengaged citizens (e.g. individuals who are active in 
three or more community organizations) are driving the results.  
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to participate in a protest as their counterparts in high-quality institution-
al settings. Moreover, while engaged citizens are more than twice as likely 
as unengaged people to protest in weak institutional settings, that differ-
ence is not nearly as glaring in strong institutional settings. Unengaged 
citizens are almost equally likely to participate in protests regardless of 
institutional context. Put simply, it seems that weak political institutions 
push the politically engaged toward protest participation while having 
very little effect on the contentious behaviors of unengaged citizens.  
Figure 7. Predicted Probabilities: Unengaged versus Engaged Citizens 
Source: The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP (2008–2012).
Models 9 and 10 include interaction terms with the Institutional Quality 
Index, on the one hand, and Education and Interest in Politics, respec-
tively, on the other. In each of these two models the coefficient term for 
the interaction is significant. Both Education and Interest in Politics 
interact similarly with the Institutional Quality Index as they do with 
Community Engagement in that each becomes a stronger predictor of 
protest participation in weak institutional contexts, particularly in the 
case of Interest in Politics. For entirely uninterested or uneducated citi-
zens, institutions fail to exert much influence on their probability of 
protesting; however, as Interest in Politics and Education increase, the 
causal import of institutional quality increases. The significant effects of 
interactions between institutions and civic engagement, education, and 
interest in politics corroborate Boulding’s findings with regard to NGOs 
0,04 0,04 0,04
0,11
0,08
0,06
Low Institutional
Quality
Medium Institutional
Quality
High Institutional
Quality
Unengaged Engaged
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(2010, 2014) and also indicate that NGO activity might simply serve as 
another example of a larger universe of organizational connections that 
fuel protest participation in distinct political environments – much in line 
with the core arguments of resource mobilization. In other words, it 
might not necessarily be the nature of NGOs specifically that motivates 
protest in weak democracies, but rather access to organizational re-
sources more generally.  
Finally, as a point of illustration, I compare the effects of communi-
ty engagement on protest participation in Argentina and Chile. As cor-
roborated by the Institutional Quality Index, Chile is known for pos-
sessing the strongest democratic institutions in Latin America, while its 
Andean neighbor has long been characterized by institutional instability 
(Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi 2011). Figure 8 shows the differ-
ence between the two countries in terms of the extent to which Com-
munity Engagement predicts Protest. 
Figure 8. Civic Engagement and Protest: Argentina versus Chile 
Source:  The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP (2008–2012). 
Holding other variables at their means in the base individual-level model 
presented above, community activism exerts a powerful positive effect 
on an individual’s probability of protesting in Argentina, but not in Chile. 
Thus, it appears that in weak institutional contexts, civic engagement is 
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strongly associated with protest participation. However, when individuals 
are not tied to these organizations or routinely exposed to the failings of 
the democratic system (Community Engagement = 0), institutions fail to 
exert much influence on contentious behavior. 
Conclusion 
This paper constitutes an effort to understand how regional economic 
and political trends have produced variation in terms of protest in Latin 
American democracies. The findings here suggest that there is an interac-
tive relationship between individual-level sociopolitical factors and coun-
try-level institutional characteristics. Low-quality political institutions 
have an important positive effect on protest participation, but only 
among citizens who are at least minimally engaged in political life. In 
other words, low-quality institutions alone cannot determine whether or 
not an individual decides to attend a protest. Rather, the combination of 
high levels of individual-level political engagement and community in-
volvement, on the one hand, and low-quality institutional environments 
where citizens feel underrepresented by formal democratic institutions, 
on the other hand, greatly increase the probability that citizens will resort 
to contentious tactics to make their voices heard. 
Rather than putting forth one variable or set of causal factors as the 
driving force behind contentious politics, I offer a more nuanced interac-
tive theory that combines two seemingly contradictory phenomena (i.e. 
dysfunctional institutions and high civic engagement) to explain protest. 
From a normative standpoint, the takeaway from this paper is a bit com-
plicated. Virtually any scholar would argue that community engagement 
serves as a positive force in democracies, and that individuals across 
Latin America and other regions are only capable of participating in 
protests because of massive gains in political liberalization made during 
the last four decades and recent socioeconomic advances that have 
seemingly laid the foundation for a rise in civic activism.  
Both points are correct. However, the massive wave of democrati-
zation that has taken place since the 1970s has also produced a multitude 
of regimes where elections occur and basic civil liberties are observed, 
but where formal representative institutions fall short in terms of effec-
tively channeling mass participation and public opinion. The results 
presented here suggest that when formal institutions fail to meet the 
needs of a highly engaged and determined populace, engaged citizens will 
adopt other means to make their claims. Mass-level democratic engage-
ment has outpaced the consolidation of high-quality formal institutions 
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in many Latin American regimes, creating a gap in terms of citizens’ 
demands for democratic representation and the supply thereof. Thus, 
while Latin American citizens are becoming more democratic in many 
ways, the regimes they inhabit are not – the swelling rates of protest 
across the region are symptomatic of this dichotomy.  
Moving beyond twenty-first century Latin America, these findings 
might also help understand how gains in social development and civic 
engagement, coupled with low-quality formal political institutions, could 
lie at the root of mass protests in other regions and time periods. Indeed, 
an increase in political engagement and the use of social media to share 
political information clearly played an important role in the Arab Spring 
countries, where citizens began to demand institutional reforms that 
made leaders more accountable to the citizenry. In Europe citizens in 
Greece and Spain – both of which possess a myriad of educated and 
engaged citizens – have been not only devastated by a severe economic 
recession, but also frustrated by their inability to make themselves heard 
by policymakers amid EU-prescribed austerity measures. Even going 
back to the civil rights movement and antiwar demonstrations in the 
1960s and 1970s in the United States, protests were seemingly led by 
increasingly active and informed citizens faced with exclusionary or non-
responsive political institutions. Thus, this paper casts light on a broader 
set of phenomena and informs scholars as they attempt to understand 
the causes and consequences of future episodes of protest participation 
across the world.  
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Compromiso Contencioso: Entendiendo la Participación en Pro-
testas en las Democracias de América Latina  
Resumen: ¿Por qué la participación en las protestas parece haberse 
expandido en gran parte de América Latina en los últimos años? ¿Cómo 
interactúan las características individuales y de cada país para dar forma 
al crecimiento de la política contenciosa en países como Argentina, Bra-
sil, y Venezuela? Considero que la reciente oleada de protesta social en 
América Latina, es producto de tendencias con respeto al compromiso 
ciudadano y el desarrollo institucional en las jóvenes democracias de la 
región. Específicamente, sostengo que la baja calidad institucional en 
estos regímenes democráticos empuja a un creciente número de latinoa-
mericanos cívicamente activos hacia formas más radicales de participa-
ción política, mientras que las habilidades de los gobiernos de satisfacer 
expectativas no logran estar a la altura de la capacidad de movilización de 
los comprometidos demócratas. Basándome en encuestas nacionales en 
América Latina, pruebo este argumento, mostrando que la interacción 
entre una comunidad comprometida e instituciones políticas poco efecti-
vas permite explicar el reciente crecimiento de la actividad política con-
tenciosa en algunos casos y las amplias diferencias en los niveles de parti-
cipación en protestas registradas a lo largo de la región. 
Palabras claves: América Latina, protesta, movimientos sociales, calidad 
institucional, compromiso ciudadano 
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Appendix
Figure A1. Community Engagement in Comparative Perspective 
Source:  The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP. 
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Figure A2. Education in Comparative Perspective 
Source:  The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP. 
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Table A1. World Bank Governance Indicator Scores, 2007–2011 
 Voice and 
Accountability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Rule of 
Law 
Institutions 
Index 
Chile 1.03 1.19 1.28 1.17 
Uruguay 1.07 0.56 0.65 0.76 
Costa Rica 0.97 0.29 0.44 0.57 
Panama 0.56 0.13 -0.14 0.18 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 0.52 0.31 -0.52 0.10 
Jamaica 0.51 0.23 -0.45 0.10 
Brazil 0.5 -0.03 -0.21 0.09 
Belize 0.65 -0.44 -0.33 -0.04 
Suriname 0.37 -0.08 -0.48 -0.06 
Guyana 0.08 -0.09 -0.22 -0.08 
Mexico 0.1 0.22 -0.61 -0.10 
Argentina 0.35 -0.18 -0.61 -0.15 
Colombia -0.18 0.06 -0.38 -0.17 
El Salvador 0.07 -0.11 -0.74 -0.26 
Peru 0.04 -0.35 -0.69 -0.33 
Dominican 
Republic 0.08 -0.577 -0.69 -0.40 
Bolivia -0.03 -0.51 -1 -0.51 
Honduras -0.44 -0.6 -0.92 -0.65 
Paraguay -0.15 -0.86 -0.95 -0.65 
Guatemala -0.29 -0.64 -1.1 -0.68 
Ecuador -0.26 -0.74 -1.14 -0.71 
Nicaragua -0.43 -0.92 -0.79 -0.71 
Venezuela -0.84 -1 -1.58 -1.14 
Haiti -0.68 -1.49 -1.37 -1.18 
Table A2. Question Wording and Descriptive Statistics 
Varia-
ble  
Question Wording or 
Explanation 
N Mean Standard 
Devia-
tion 
Min Max 
Dependent Variable      
Protest “In the last 12 months, 
have you participated in a 
demonstration or protest 
march?” Yes (1); No (0). 
105,600 .103 .304 0 1 
Independent Variables 
Com-
munity 
Engage
gage-
ment 
“Now, changing the 
subject. In the last 12 
months have you tried to 
help to solve a problem in 
your community or in 
your neighborhood? 
116,526 19.628 16.661 0 100 
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Varia-
ble  
Question Wording or 
Explanation 
N Mean Standard 
Devia-
tion 
Min Max 
Please, tell me if you did 
it at least once a week, 
once or twice a month, 
once or twice a year or 
never in the last 12 
months.” This was 
repeated for religious 
organization, parents’ 
association, community 
improvement organiza-
tion, an association of 
professionals, or a politi-
cal party. 4-point scale; 
higher values = more 
participation. 
Answers to these ques-
tions were then converted 
into an index. 
Exter-
nal 
Effica-
cy 
“Those who govern this 
country are interested in 
what people like you 
think. How much do you 
agree or disagree with this 
statement?”  
100-point scale; higher 
values = more efficacy. 
111,596 39.365 32.099 0 100 
System 
Sup-
port 
Index 
“I am going to ask you a 
series of questions. I am 
going to ask that you use 
the numbers provided in 
the ladder to answer.  
1. To what extent do you 
think the courts in (coun-
try) guarantee a fair trial? 
2. To what extent do you 
respect the political 
institutions of (country)? 
3. To what extent do you 
think that citizens’ basic 
rights are well protected 
by the political system of 
(country)? 
4. To what extent do you 
feel proud of living under 
the political system of 
(country)? 
5. To what extent do you 
think that one should 
support the political 
system of (country)?”  
7-point scale; higher 
113,147 52.234 22.548 0 100 
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Varia-
ble  
Question Wording or 
Explanation 
N Mean Standard 
Devia-
tion 
Min Max 
values = more positive 
evaluation of institutions.  
Answers to these ques-
tions were then converted 
into an index.  
Per-
sonal 
Eco-
nomic 
Situa-
tion 
“How would you describe 
your overall economic 
situation? Would you say 
that it is very good, good, 
neither good nor bad, bad 
or very bad?” 
100-point scale; higher 
values = good.  
115,949 49.441 20.987 0 100 
Na-
tional 
Eco-
nomic 
Situa-
tion 
“How would you describe 
the country’s economic 
situation? Would you say 
that it is very good, good, 
neither good nor bad, bad 
or very bad?” 
100-point scale; higher 
values = good. 
115,512 42.121 23.367 0 100 
Satis-
faction 
with 
Public 
Ser-
vices 
“And thinking about this 
city/area where you live, 
are you very satisfied, 
satisfied, dissatisfied, or 
very dissatisfied with the 
condition of the streets, 
roads, and highways?” 
Repeated for public 
health services and 
schools. 
100-point scale; higher 
values = more satisfied.  
34,685 50.194 19.471 0 100 
Interest 
in 
Politics 
How much interest do 
you have in politics: a lot, 
some, little or none? 
100-point scale; higher 
values = more interest.  
115,418 35.277 .772 0 100 
Shared 
Infor-
mation 
via 
Social 
Net-
work 
And in the last 12 
months, have you read or 
shared political infor-
mation through any social 
network website such as 
Twitter or Facebook or 
Orkut? 
Coded as 1 if “yes,” 0 if 
“no.” 
38,126 .111 .327 0 1 
Percep-
tion of 
Cor-
ruption 
Taking into account your 
own experience or what 
you have heard, corrup-
tion among public offi-
109,775 72.385 28.472 0 100 
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Varia-
ble  
Question Wording or 
Explanation 
N Mean Standard 
Devia-
tion 
Min Max 
cials is very common, 
common, uncommon or 
very uncommon? 100-
point scale; higher values 
= higher perception of 
corruption.  
Age Respondents’ age in 
years.  
116,042 39.193 15.803 16 99 
Wealth 
Quin-
tile 
A weighted index that 
measures wealth based on 
the possession of certain 
household goods such as 
televisions, refrigerators, 
conventional and cellular 
telephones, vehicles, 
washing machines, mi-
crowave ovens, indoor 
plumbing, indoor bath-
rooms, and computers.  
116,275 2.933 1.422 1 5 
Educa-
tion 
Level of formal educa-
tion. 4-point scale; 
0=None, 1=Primary, 
2=Secondary, 3=Superior 
116,656 1.817 0.772 0 3 
Female 1 if female, 0 if male. 116,655 0.501 0.500 0 1 
Table A3. Descriptions of World Bank Governance Indicators 
Voice and Accountability: “Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country’s 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media.”
Government Effectiveness: “Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pres-
sures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
the government’s commitment to such policies.” 
Rule of Law: “Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract en-
forcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence.” 
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Table A4. Community Engagement and Protest: Instrumental Variables 
Regression 
VARIABLES Model 1 
IVReg 
(2SLS) 
 Second stage (DV: Protest) 
Community Participation .0007*** (.0001) 
Female  -.024*** (.002) 
Age -.0004*** (.00006) 
Interest in Politics .001*** (.00003) 
Education .027*** (.001) 
Wealth -.0002 (.0007) 
Internal Efficacy -.00007** (.00003) 
Constant .030*** (.005) 
 First stage (DV: Community Participation) 
Church Attendance  .200*** (.001) 
Female  .423*** (.003) 
Age .013*** (.003) 
Interest in Politics .072*** (.002) 
Education -.027 (.072) 
Wealth .015 (.037) 
Internal efficacy 018*** (.002) 
Constant 5.374*** (.001) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic  19557.97 
Number of Observations 96,546 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Two-tailed 
tests. 
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Table A5. Interaction Effects for Second-Level Economic Factors and 
Community Engagement 
 Protest Participation 
VARIABLES (1 = Protested) 
Model 1 
(1 = Protested) 
Model 2 
(1 = Protested) 
Model 3 
Female -0.299*** -0.299*** -0.299*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Age -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Wealth (quintile) 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Interest in Politics 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Education 0.278*** 0.278*** 0.278*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Community Participa-
tion 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Presidential Approval -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Interpersonal Trust -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Personal Economic 
Situation -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Gini Index (2009) 2.293 3.539 3.801 
 (2.770) (2.604) (2.594) 
HDI (2007) 3.378 2.760 0.978 
 (2.680) (3.047) (2.127) 
GDP growth (annual) 0.026 0.026 0.039 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.044) 
Institutions Index 3.500 -2.218 -0.416 
 (2.558) (2.233) (0.345) 
Gini * Community  -7.907   
 (5.295)   
HDI * Community  2.262  
  (2.618)  
Growth * Community   0.031 
   (0.063) 
Constant -7.098*** -7.226** -5.938** 
 (2.568) (2.901) (2.479) 
Observations 96,058 96,058 96,058 
Number of Country 
Years 67 67 67 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
